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As with epidemics, economic slumps, seasonal unemployment, 
and riotous disorder, great fires afflicted British North American com-
munities with frightening regularity. An estimate of all recorded con-
flagrations between 1815 and 1915, attributed fifty-five percent to North 
America. Of these nearly 300 major North-American blazes, over forty 
struck communities in Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and New-
foundland. Within British North America certain cities recorded especially 
alarming histories, acknowledged by the fight of the insurance companies 
after costly disasters. By one assessment, Quebec led with thirteen 
serious fires, Saint John, New Brunswick had seven, Montreal five and 
St. John's, Newfoundland three. 1 Allowing for different definitions of 
a conflagration, these estimates can change, but alterations would not 
detract from the presence of fires as a major cause of social trauma and 
urban transformation. Quebec reeled under the singular misfortune of 
two conflagrations in the spring and summer of 1845, leaving an estimated 
20,000 homeless. The following summer, a St. John's blaze burnt out 
over half the populace of 20,000; a hurricane compounded distress. 
In 1852, 10,000 were rendered homeless in Montreal. Delegates from 
Canada and the Maritimes journeyed to London for nation building, 
while the civic authorities of Quebec coped with winter relief for roughly 
15,000 victims of yet another of that city's fires. The symbolic end to the 
golden age of Saint John might well be dated from the 1877 destruction 
of the business district and shelter for 15,000. St. John's approached the 
winter of 1892 with 10,000 divested of lodgings (Table 1). 
* Department of History, McMaster University. 
** Department of History, Dalhousie University. 
1 J . Grove SMITH, Fire Waste in Canada (Ottawa: Commission of Conservation, 
1918), pp. 99-104; NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTIVE AsSOCIATION, Conflagrations in America 
Since 1900 (Boston: N. F. P. A., 1951), pp. 2-9. 
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Table l.- MAJOR CoNFLAGRATIONS AND SELECTED MINOR FIRES MENTIONED IN TEXT.* -00 
Estimated Estimated 
Number of Number 
Location Date Alleged Source Dwellings of 
of Fire Destroyed Homeless 
St. John's 12 February 1816 - 120 1,000 :I: 
-St. John's November 1817 Two fires 300 2,500 Vl 
Miramichi Valley October 1825 Forest fire 300 Large death toll >-l 0 
Fredericton October 1825 - 80 
-- ~ 
Saint John 14 January 1837 - 115 - trl 
Saint John 19 August 1839 Candle in warehouse - - Vl 0 Boucherville 20June 1843 - 140 100 families on relief (') 
Quebec 18 May 1845 Boiler explosion I ,500-2,000 12,000 -> Quebec 28 June 1845 - 1,500 10,000 t""' trl St. John's 4 October 1845 Coffee warehouse 100 - I St. John's 9 June 1846 Cabinet maker's glue pot 2,000 12,000 Vl 
Toronto 7 August 1849 Tavern - - 0 
Montreal 17 June 1850 Boys playing with matches 190 - (') 
-Fredericton II November 1850 - 120 180 families > 
Montreal 8 July 1852 Butcher shop 800-1,000 10,000 t""' 
:I: St. John's 9 September 1856 - 200 1,500 
-Vl Halifax 9 September 1859 Warehouse Business District - >-l 
Charlottetown 16 July 1866 
- 100 30 families 0 ~ Quebec 14 October 1866 Tavern lamp 1,500 12,000-15,000 
-< 
Carleton County August 1870 Rural fire 
-
2,000 
Saint John 20 June 1877 Steam engine spark 1,500 10,000-13,000 
St. John's 8 July 1892 Barn/arson? 1,500 9,000-10,000 
*The list includes the serious disasters but is not a comprehensive list. Fires destroying 100 to 200 dwellings were 
too frequent to record. 
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That the potential for disasters of such proportions had been built 
into the very materials of the city formed an accepted circumstance of 
colonial life, well grounded in eighteenth-century and immediate expe-
rience. At mid-century, despite official inquiries and experiments with 
pumps and tests on techniques to fireproof wood, experience had bred 
a fatalism. "All who know the country will readily grant, that the destruc-
tion of wooden built towns, is nothing more nor less than a question of 
time. - In the ordinary course of events they are all at some time burn-
ed." "People", warned the Halifax Morning Journal, "some how or other 
seem to forget that they are living from year to year in a match-box." 
The Saint John News in 1859 noted that serious fires had claimed "a 
hundred houses at a time every two or three years". Likewise, readers 
of the Montreal Pilot were reminded after the 1852 fire that lesser fires 
"within the last six or seven years" had turned nearly "one-half of the 
City into ashes''. With a twist of revealing irony the Montreal New Era 
edited by Thomas D' Arcy McGee in 1857 would "regret having in this 
our first issue to report a serious conflagration". The new era had not 
arrived. The proprietor of the Ottawa Times, in Quebec the day of the 
1866 fire, concluded that apathy was "convincing proof of the all too great 
frequency of fires in this part of the world, that in fact we had gotten 
used to them even on a grand scale". Shoddy growth cast up by the. 
exploitative timber trade and immigration had made British North Ameri-
can cities susceptible to assorted crises of which fire presented the most 
dramatic form. Hardened by familiarity with colonial conditions, resigna-
tion also had the counsel of religious sentiment and popular wisdom, as 
suggested by this verse from a 1866 poem "To the Quebec Sufferers". 
The stroke is hard 
For ye, I know, 
Yet let not despair sway 
Look up for help, 
And the same pow'r 
Will grant it if ye pray. 
It is plausible that appeals to accept one's lot were not caused solely by 
notions of divine justice, but reveal how terribly unsure authorities and 
the fortunate were of being able to sustain social order. 2 
A marked decline in the number of conflagrations among cities 
fits a pattern of changes in civic order and health all of which advanced 
concurrently in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. It is slight-
ly arbitrary, but from the 1840s through the 1870s, police forces, sanitary 
reform and civic engineers marked a passing of an epoch of urban history 
2 Public Archives of Canada (hereafter referred to as PAC), Pamphlet Collection, 
An Act for Appointing Commissioners to Inquire into the Late Destructive Fires in this Prov-
ince (Fredericton : Geo. K. Lugrin, 1826). For preventive research on materials see Debates 
of the Legislative Assembly of United Canada, V, part I (1846) , ed .: Elaine NAVES (Montreal: 
Presses de I'Ecole des hautes etudes commerciales, 1974), pp. 128-38. On fatalism see New 
Brunswick Reporter, 20 December 1850 ; Halifax Morning Journal, 14 September 1859; Saint 
John News quoted in Halifax Evening Express, l February 1861; Montreal Pilot, 2 August 
1852; New Era, 15 May 1857 ; Ottawa Citizen, 20 October 1866. 
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during which ad hoc voluntary responses to crises had been character-
istic. Similar to the other important reforms, fire related measures fore-
shadowed elements in the urban progressive movement of the early 
twentieth century. In both reform eras, businessmen, interested in the 
overall efficient operation of an urban system, endeavoured to reshape 
the city. In the instances of campaigns for professional fire departments, 
building codes, and civic water systems, business considerations related 
to a growing importance of fire insurance companies helped to augment 
the functions of urban government when and where innovation presented 
economic utility. Admitte9ly, the analytic framework is not perfect. The 
designation of periods poses difficulty. Major urban fires declined, but 
there were exceptions. Hull would be devastated in 1900 and Toronto 
suffered a serious commercial fire in 1904. Resource towns have remained 
vulnerable to forest fires. Nonetheless, twentieth-century urban Canada 
has enjoyed remarkable security. An additional problem is that the sug-
gested dates for fundamental change do not fit every situation. Generally, 
cities adopted measures at a similar pace, but St. John's took preventive 
steps roughly three decades after other centres. After all no comprehensive 
explanation of urban transformation can omit the clash of technology and 
business objectives with tradition, politics, and meagre fiscal resources. 
As well, inertia has to be considered. For example, Toronto delayed 
creating a professional fire department and public ownership of its water-
works. Unlike the innovative centres, Quebec, Montreal and Saint John, 
Toronto had avoided serious disasters. 
I 
Some cities required greater reformation than others. Catastrophe 
did not bedevil Toronto, Kingston and Hamilton. Toronto's great blaze 
of 1849 stopped short of a major disaster. 3 It was not simply a matter of 
there being greater use of brick and stone in tidy Upper Canada. Indeed, 
the proportion of frame dwellings did not vary significantly among the 
urban centres of the Canadas - two-thirds to three-quarters describe 
the range in 1851. 4 Possibly, it was higher in Saint John and St. John's. 
More to the point, the older ports of the Maritimes and Quebec had sig-
nificant concentrations of older buildings on a compact street layout. 
Their waterfronts, replete with timber deals and piles of shingles, invited 
disaster. On his 1845-46 tour of British North America, an insurance 
investigator branded St. John's "the worst built town I have seen since I 
3 F. H. ARMSTRONG, "The First Great Fire of Toronto, 1849", Ontario History, 
LIII, 3 (1961): 201-21; Toronto Examiner, 11 April 1849. 
4 The Census information offers only an informed estimate. Assessment roDs are 
more reliable. Using these for Hamilton in 1861 Michael Doucet has concluded that seventy-
one percent of dwellings were frame. See DoucET, "Workingclass Housing in a Small 
Nineteenth Century Canadian City: Hamilton, Ontario 1852-1881", in Essays in Working 
Class History, eds: Greg KEALEY and Peter WARRIAN (Toronto: McCleUand and Stewart, 
1976), pp. 83-105. 
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left England". That brutally frank and bigoted English traveller, Isabella 
Bird, found the port-city dock areas of 1856 deserving but one description 
- shabby. She scrambled over "gravel-heaps and piles of timber into 
the dirty unlighted streets of Halifax". In Saint John she winced at the 
sight of the lower parts of town - "dirty in the extreme ... and strewn 
to a depth of several inches with sawdust". At Quebec, she discovered 
"a world below" with broken windows covered in paper or stuffed with 
rags and refuse piled on the streets. 5 No such vivid tableaux coloured 
her impr~ssions of Canada West. A clearly acknowledged regional dif-
ference fostered a separate procedure for fire investigations in Canada 
East as opposed to Canada West after 1861. Quebec and Montreal raised 
suspicions ; it would appear that they were singled out for persistent 
review. Hence, individuals could force a public-financed inquiry. However, 
in Canada West with its more regular street layout and progressive repu-
tation - where "great expense in many cases is needlessly cast upon 
Municipalities by investigations into accidents by Fire being unneces-
sarily held" - the party requesting an inquiry would have to pay costs. 6 
It is a small point, but arrayed with the economic and physical charac-
teristics of the Atlantic ports it reinforces the impression of Canada 
West as a less disaster-prone colony. 
Conflagrations, the sweeping fires which spread beyond control to 
destroy large areas of built-up property, struck as dreadful episodes in 
local history. More important for an understanding of nineteenth-century 
urban society, major fires had common features indicating aspects of class, 
elements of protest, dimensions of reform and spiritual attitudes. Destruc-
tion engendered extremes in personal and community conduct: heroism 
and looting, optimism and drunken despair, planning and expediency, 
charitable generosity and petty thrift. An extraordinary event, the major 
fire nonetheless disclosed many commonplace patterns of behaviour. 
These disasters - captured in the press, the reports of visitors and the 
inquiries of local authorities - provided flash-points which can reveal 
qualitative insight into the make-up of urban society. 
During long periods of hot dry weather, cities turned into tinder 
with heat decreasing the moisture content and kindling temperature of 
wood. 7 Along roof-tops, weathered cedar shingles provided flamable 
pathways and the stock for fire brands. Those who could afford it lived 
in stone or brick dwellings with tin roofs; a few buildings had iron 
shutters. 8 Construction of the popular mansard-style roof during the 1850s 
and 1860s increased exposure. Shingles would remain the major cause 
of uncontrollable fires across North America until the 1920s. 9 Dwellings, 
5 PAC, MG24 , Dll, J. J. BROOMFIELD, "Visits to Canada and Newfoundland, 
1845-6", p. 16; Isabella Lucy BIRD, The Englishwoman in America (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 16, 83, 265-66. For a comparable assessment of Quebec street 
conditions, see "Special Report of the Relief Committee", Quebec Mercury, 15 July 1845. 
6 Statutes of Canada, 24 Vic. Cap. 33. 
7 N. F. P. A., Conflagrations in America, p. 15. 
8 Basil Hall, Travels in North America (Edinburgh, 1829), p. 390. 
9 N. F. P. A., Conflagrations in America, p. 13. 
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of course, were predominantly frame. Backcourts bristled with pnvtes 
and storage sheds. To the officer commanding Quebec's garrison in 1845, 
the lower suburbs loomed as horrific fire traps. "Besides almost the 
whole of these suburbs being constructed of wood, all the intervening 
spaces betwixt the streets, the gardens, yards were filled with stacks of 
deals connected by wooden palings and every sort of combustible matter 
heaped together." 10 In the age of horsepower, straw and hay were stock-
piled in profusion. On streets with concentrations of commerce and crafts, 
dangers mounted. Post-fire investigations listed the perished contents of 
warehouses: paper, canvas, cordage, pitch, oils, tallow, drygoods, shin-
gles, gunpowder, distilled spirits, and other high risk items invariably 
crowded the wharf areas. On an 1808-09 inspection tour for the Phoenix 
company, Jenkin Jones recommended against insuring Lower Town 
property in Quebec as "there were large wooden stores in which are 
frequently deposited quantities of spirits''. 11 Artisan and merchant shops 
brought additional hazards. An 1860 list of dangerous trades compiled by 
the Phoenix Fire Assurance Company's Montreal office indicated a host 
of activities scattered around every British North American city: 
... amongst the trades deemed hazardous are included Apothecaries, Chemist 
and Druggists, Dyers, Distillers, Brewers, Maltsters, Bakers, Confectioners, 
Carpenters, and all other workers in wood, Mills of all descriptions, Manu-
facturers of Cotton, Hemp, Flax, Soap, Candles, Starch, Snuff, Tobacco, and 
Hats; Theatres, Sugar Refineries, Sail Makers, Ship Chandlers, Inns, Taverns, 
Hotels, Stable Keepers, Founders and Printers. 12 
In their use of space and materials mid-nineteenth-century cities differed 
little from those of the previous century. 
It is not remarkable that fire, the necessary servant of home and 
industry, was handled carelessly. Familiarity reduced vigilance and there 
were innumerable ways for "the same fire that seems so gentle, harm-
less and friendly" to become "master and tyrant" . 13 Chimney sweeps, 
still a self-regulating guild in Quebec City until the way for civic control 
was prepared in 1855, seldom visited workingmen's homes. Sarcastically 
referred to as gentry, sweeps faced persistent demands for reform: a 
public competition for the right to clean chimneys, a certificate of guar-
antee to be issued by sweeps or a civic imposed rate structure. 14 For the 
most part, the poor resorted to burning soot from their chimneys, a 
practice which sent up a shower of sparks. 15 Candles, coal-oil lamps, 
10 PAC, C.O. 42, volume 526, Province of Canada 1845, June-August Despatches, 
Major General J. A. Hope to the Earl of Cathcart, I July 1845. 
11 PHOENIX OF LONDON GROUP, First in the Field (Toronto 1956), p. II. 
12 Public Archives of Ontario (hereafter referred to as PAO), Alexander Morris 
Papers, 1860, Insurance Policy with the Phoenix Fire Assurance Company taken by 
Alexander Morris and Hugh Allan, Executors of the Estate of the Late William Morris, 
II December 1860. 
13 St. John's Evening Telegram, 4 November 1892. 
14 
"City of Quebec Act of Incorporation", Statutes of Canada, 18 Vic. Cap. 159, 
Section LVII; Quebec Mercury, 15, 17, 19, 30 June 1845. The latter editorial mentioned 
regulations dated 1676 and 1727. 
IS Quebec Mercury, 14 October 1845. 
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and matches provided ubiquitous hazards. The pedestrian city, more or 
less mixing residences with industrial establishments, brought forges and, 
by mid-century, steam boilers into contact with dwellings and stored 
goods. The explosion of a tannery boiler touched off the first Quebec 
conflagration of 1845. 16 The Legislative Assembly of Canada subsequently 
formed a Select Committee ''to inquire into the causes of fires arising 
from the use of ste.am engines on land and water". The Saint John blaze 
of 1877 began when a steam engine spark, probably from Kirk's lumber 
mill, landed on Fairweather's hay store. A prior fire had been set by sparks 
from McLaughlin's factory. 17 
To the toll of domestic and industrial accidents must be added the 
dangers of lightning, forest fires, and arson. Forest fires plagued New 
Brunswick in October 1825, sweeping the Miramichi valley, destroying 
several small communities and threatening Fredericton. The smoke from 
a rural blaze in Carleton County, Ontario in August 1870 enveloped disant 
Kingston while it left thousands homeless and nearly entered Ottawa. 18 
Whether or not arsonists set many fires that grew into major conflagrations 
cannot be resolved ; contemporaries could not agree. Groundless rumours 
flourished and blatantly alarmist allegations provided sensational gos-
sip. 19 Certainly many specific targets went under the torch as acts of 
political, economic, and sectarian conflict. The most celebrated Canadian 
burning, that of the Parliament Building at Montreal in 1849, 20 demon-
strates the relationship between incendiarism and an outraged element of 
society, but there were further instances. Together with strife in other 
forms - election mobs, violent competition for employment and navvy 
camp disorder - incendiarism betrayed an underside to the colonies. 
Incendiarism along the Niagara frontier in 1838-39 was attributed to 
Patriot Hunter action. A feud among Saint John joiners in 1840 was 
alleged to have culminated in the destruction of buildings under construc-
tion. In 1852 an Irish servant set fire to his former employer's residence 
16 New Brunswick Courier, 24 August 1839; Halifax Evening Express, 22 October 
1866 ; Le Pays, 23 October 1866; Le Canadien, 29 May 1845. 
17 General Index to the Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada ... /841-
/851 (Montreal: John Lovell, 1855). No report was printed, but some editorials did propose 
a ban on steam engines. See Communique quoted in Journal de Quebec, 7 June 1845. New 
Brunswick Museum, Manuscript Collection, "An Investigation into the Causes of the Great 
Fire". See testimony of Henry H. Fairweather. 
18 Major Samuel STRICKLAND, Twenty-Seven Years in Canada West or the Ex-
perience of an Early Settler, 2 vols. (Edmonton: Hurtig Reprint, 1970), pp. 20-25; W. F. 
GANONG, "On the Limits of the Great Fire of Miramichi of 1825", Bulletin of the Natural 
History Society of New Brunswick, XXIV (1906): 410-18 ; Otawa Times, 19 August 1870 ; 
Kingston British Whig , 23 August 1870. 
19 For contemporary discussion see Montreal Pilot, 15 July 1845; Charlottetown 
Herald, 21 November 1866. Arson was a significant factor in the fire loss reports of On-
tario. See Detailed Reports of the Inspector of Insurance which appeared in the Sessional 
Papers beginning in 1886. 
2° Compare the account in Donald CREIGHTON, The Empire of the St . Lawrence 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), p. 378 with that of Jacques MoNET, The Last Cannon Shot: 
A Study of French-Canadian Nationalism, /837-1850 (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 
1969), pp. 337-38. 
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in Montreal. Hamilton merchants feared that an 1856 rash of warehouse 
fires was "the work of incendiaries". Riotous livery stable operators 
burned down the premises of Toronto omnibus proprietor Mr E. A. Jones 
in 1857. Incendiary assaults on meeting halls suggest that the conflict 
between Orange and Green had their fiery side. 21 Bam burnings, along 
with cattle mutilation offered methods of vengeance practiced from St. 
John's to Toronto. After six bamfires in a single season, the Fredericton 
Head Quarters wondered whether the formerly "peaceful community" 
now harboured "wretches so wicked as would from malice, revenge, 
or the love of plunder fire their neighbour's house". 22 An inquiry into 
an 1892 blaze in St. John's raised a suspicion that both bam burning 
and cattle maiming might have been connected with the source of the 
disaster. Testimony indicated that the fire had begun in Timothy Brine's 
bam. "Its origin is so far a mystery,- and whether it resulted from the 
wilful act of the man Fitzpatrick, now on trial for cutting the tongues of 
Brine's horses, or resulted from accident, cannot now be ascertained." 23 
With social conditions through much of the first half of the nineteenth 
century conducive to unrest, 24 petitions for compensation or rewards 
stemming from acts of incendiarism and the designation of categories of 
arson as either capital offences or felonies imply that fire provided a 
convenient form of malicious injury to property. 25 The increased use 
of fire insurance by mid-century tempted a different category of crime. 
The Chief Engineer of the Toronto Fire Department attributed arsonists 
with setting fifteen of fifty-five fires in 1866. Interestingly, he and others 
warned of a new crime - not primitive protest but the insurance fire -
and demanded that insurance companies closely screen applicants seeking 
protection. 26 By the tum of the century, civic authorities could consider 
arson a white-collar crime committed by "dissatisfied owners of properties 
... to secure the amount of insurance policies covering them". 27 
21 Toronto British Colonist, 22 January 1840; City Gazette quoted in Saint John 
Courier, 8 February 1840; La Minerve, 13 July 1852; City of Toronto Archives, "Report 
of the Chief Engineer of the Fire Department", Toronto Council Minutes ... 1866, Appendix 
10, p. 18. See the synopsis of petitions from Renfrew (1855), Oxford (1860) and Kent (1860) 
under "Incendiarism" in General Index to the Journals of the Legislative Assembly, p. 431. 
PAC, MG24, Dl6, vol. 30, Robert Harris to Isaac Buchanan, 13 October 1856. 
22 Fredericton Head Quarters, 4 December 1850. 
23 St. John's Evening Telegram , 6 September 1892. 
24 Michael CRoss, "The Shiners' War : Social Violence in Ottawa Valley in the 
1830s", Canadian Historical Review, LIV (March 1973): 1-26; Bryan PALMER, "Discor-
dant Music: Charivaris and Whitecapping in Nineteenth-Century North America", Labour I 
Le Travailleur, III (1978): 5-62. 
2
' For petitions see PAC, RGI, E3 , vol. 36, p. 173; RG5, CI, vol. 391, # 1237. The 
legislation concerning arson and the increase of felonious categories of arson appears in 
Statutes of Canada, 4 and 5 Vic. Cap. 26; 10 and 11 Vic. Cap. 4; 12 Vic. Cap. 20; 18 Vic. 
Cap. 92. 
26 PAC, Pamphlet Collection, The Late Fire in Stratford and Mr. A. F. Mickle 
(Toronto: Maclean, Thomas and Company, 1858), pp. 9-10. 
27 W. H. RIDDELL, President of Waterloo Board of Trade, "Incendiarism and Fire 
Waste", in Mutual Fire Underwriters' Association of Ontario, ed.: Seneca JoNES (Hamilton, 
1899). 
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Documented instances of protest incendiarism and the fact that the 
mid-century brought thousands of strangers through most cities gave 
substance to fears and encouraged the hysteria of lynch-mob editorials. 
''A little wholesome hanging of scoundrels would preserve to the honest 
portion of our people their lives, their properties and their peaceful hap-
piness." Peculiar events after a fire - "a Sambo's strange prophecy", 
the odd behaviour of "an old lunatic" and ruffians buying "Lucifer mat-
ches" - stirred up a passion for vigilance. In the days following the 
1852 Montreal fire, there issued warnings that "the match of a devil driven 
incendiary may one of these nights complete the work of ruin". "Our 
little town", reported the Charlottetown Examiner, "is in a state of alarm. 
We can no longer doubt that we are inflicted with an organized band 
of incendiaries; - what their purpose is, heaven only knows." 28 A crip-
pling fire and reports of Fenian operations on the mainland colonies raised 
a sense of conspiracy - by no means a unique attitude. 
Whatever the cause of fires, terrain was important. Fires beginning 
in low sections of a city, usually the dockyard area, had the gravest 
potential. 29 Buildings on the uphill side were exposed to the heat of 
structures burning below them. Presently, thermal updraughts developed 
and drew in air to the side of the burning area so rapidly that a high wind 
roared at the edge, 
And fitful gusts of sudden wind were sent 
With angry howl, and ominous portent; 
And all appearance seem'd to indicate 
Some coming wrath, and near impending fate. 30 
Fire brands flew across roof-tops, but more mysterious, the superheated 
gases generated by a lack of oxygen moved aloft to explode spontaneously 
and compound the mayhem. Radiated heat waves thrust the fire horizontal-
ly in a manner which astonished witnesses. "The fire appeared to pay 
no attention whatever to brick walls and iron shutters, but ran through 
them in the same manner as water would go through a sieve." Onlookers 
at the_ 1839 conflagration in Saint John watched in awe as intense heat 
and firebrands caused buildings 200 feet across the Market Square to 
burst into flames. After an 1859 Halifax fire, "everyone expressed surprise 
at the extent of the destruction in a section of the city formerly consider-
ed fire proof." 31 Incendiarism offered a plausible theory in these baffling 
circumstances, making it difficult to separate fact from hysteria. Con-
flagrations, after all, defied the commonsense belief that fire spread by 
contact. At this stage, with flames 1,000 feet and 1,500° F, the fire attained 
greatest intensity. 
28 New Brunswick Reporter, 20 December 1850; Montreal Pilot, 2 August 1852; 
Charlottetown Examiner, 13 August 1866. 
29 N. F. P. A., Conflagrations in America, pp. 11-13. This was the case in Quebec 
1845, Montreal 1852, Saint John 1877, and St. John's 1892. 
30 Library of Parliament, Pamphlet Collection, Lines Commemorative of the Awful 
Conflagration of St. Roch's, May 28, /845 (Quebec, 1845). 
31 SMITH, Fire Waste in Canada, p. 103; Charlottetown Herald, 18 July 1866; New 
Brunswick Courier, 24 August 1839; Halifax British Colonist, 13 September 1859. 
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Onwards, and onwards and onwards swept the flames - street after street 
fell before them. A species of whirlwind seemed to aid its fatal advances -
for in advance, in the rear, on every side the raging element developed itself 
with momentarily increasing fury. Spots that to the shrieking and affrightened 
refugee were now apparently safe in a few minutes subsequent were wrapped 
in vast sheets of flame. 3 2 
From a secure vantage point, a burning city presented a spectacle 
for painters, poets, writers, and later photographers. It could be argued 
that conflagrations were the epic events of British North America. 33 Safe 
on the heights of Quebec, the 1866 fire below "bore the appearance of 
a seething cauldron from the surface of which rose dense clouds of blind-
ing smoke ... the sombreness of which was only to be relieved at intervals 
by the occasional bursting through of the glare of flames, shooting up 
their forked and hissing tongues towards the heavens". To writer George 
Stewart, the burning of the gas house and coal piles in the Saint John 
disaster of 1877 was "one of the most beautiful sights which were wit-
nessed that night", while the fiery destruction of ships resembled "a gala-
day celebration of fireworks on a large scale". 34 On the stricken streets, 
frantic movements broke the spectacle into a multitude of more desperate 
events. 
Such was the scene, the hurrying to and fro, 
The noise, the shouting, and the voice of woe; 
The vain attempts of multitudes to save 
The little all long years of labour gave, 
As loaded vehicles with haste convey 
The relics of their property away, 
And pile the general aggregation where 
'Twas hoped, but vainly hoped, the flame would spare. 35 
When fire companies fell back, the rush for safety began. 36 Residents 
and shop owners in threatened blocks tried to cart their belongings to 
safety - only to move again and again. A few exploited the panic. During 
the 1852 Montreal fire, "les conducteurs de cabs" raised rates from two 
or three piasters to twenty or thirty. Carters who received an extraor-
dinary $5 a load at the outset of the 1877 Saint John fire could afford 
to refuse $30 to $50 for an hour's work.J7 "Baffled by the sudden and 
32 Quebec Mercury, 29 May 1845. 
33 For poetry see Library of Parliament, Pamphlet Collection, Lines Commemo-
rative; "To the Quebec Sufferers", Ottawa Citizen, 13 November 1866; "To the Memory 
of Lieutenant Baines, R. A.", Quebec Morning Chronicle, 2 November 1866; "Ballad of 
the Burning of St. John's, July 8th, 1892", Evening Telegram, 8 July 1893; Arthur SLADER, 
The Burning City: Saint John, New Brunswick, 1834 (Re~rinted by Loyalist Colonies Press, 
Kingston, Ontario, 1980), pp. 1-11. The Montreal Pilot published a special issue 6 August 
1852, suitable for sending to distant friends. Illustrations and momentos were plentiful. For 
the activities of one painter who took advantage of the scene see John R. PoRTER, The 
Works of Joseph Legan?, 1795-1855 (Ottawa: The National Gallery of Canada, National 
Museums of Canada, 1978), pp. 90-95. 
34 George STEWART, The Story of the Great Fire in Saint John, New Brunswick 
(Toronto: Belford Brothers, 1877), pp. 93, 150. 
35 Library of Parliament, Pamphlet Collection, Lines Commemorative. 
36 See accounts of panic in Montreal Pilot, 28 July 1852; Le Courrier du Canada, 
15 October 1866. 
37 La Minerve, 13 July 1852; STEWART, Great Fire of Saint John, p. 82. 
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unlooked for directions the fire took, the unfortunate refugees at last 
yielded themselves up to apathetic despair. From street to street they 
wended their way laden with children and the most precious of their 
household goods." Some people took refuge in churches, assuming stone 
buildings to be fire proof, only to be forced to move again. "Women, 
children - nay even men - sat weeping by the road-side." 38 
II 
Preoccupied refugees had little interest in rallying to the fire com-
panies' calls for aid, but less defensible were curious spectators. Crowds 
held back as fire companies requested assistance. So outraged were the 
Halifax officials responsible for organizing fire defence, the firewards, 
at public behaviour in an 1821 fire that they met at the Exchange Coffee 
House and censured inhabitants for "the disgraceful indifference and want 
of exertion manifested ... at the late distressing fire". In future, constables 
were to attend with their staves and assist enforcement of firewards' 
orders. During the 1849 fire, Toronto spectators debated for fifteen min-
utes whether or not St. James Cathedral wOJJld catch fire from the sparks, 
but they did not heed requests to join the fire-fighters. Haligonians in 
1859 were brought to man fire engines by compulsion. A lone man in 
Saint John tried to prevent sparks in the 1877 fire from igniting barrels of 
petroleum; the crowd rejected his appeals for aid with drunken stares and 
jeers. 39 Episodes of public apathy and fear were legion and what they 
suggest indirectly is the labour intensive nature of combatting fires. 
Until the 1860s, later in some centres, manpower rather than tech-
nology dominated fire fighting. The fundamental tactics and equipment 
had progressed only slightly from the eighteenth century. Until the instal-
lation of electric systems in the 1860s and 1870s, even the alarm was 
spread manually, by runners and bell ringing. The two buckets and two 
leather bags required of members of the Hand-in-Hand Company in Halifax 
by its 1789 by-laws yielded to wider use of rudimentary manual pumps. 
Even so, the pumps employed in the 1850s differed only marginally from 
the standard eighteenth-century engines. Whether for hauling water by 
bucket brigades, manning the "brakes" of a pump or ripping up threaten-
ed roof-tops, muscle power was essential. Large bucket brigades of as 
many as 1,500 civilians and soldiers could be raised in mid-century Halifax. 
During a Charlottetown crisis, even the Lieutenant-Governor and ladies 
joined the "bucketline". As for volunteer companies, depending upon 
38 Quebec Mercury, 29 May 1845; Quebec Chronicle quoted in Evening Express , 
22 October 1866; Quebec Mercury, 31 May 1845. 
39 On the role offirewards see PAC, Pamphlet Collection, The Quebec Fire Society, 
Municipal Rules, Regulations and Statutes of the City of Quebec (Quebec: Frechette, 1833), 
p. 8; Hamilton City Records, By-law Book Number I, By-law 9, 1850. On the issue of public 
indifference see Public Archives of Nova Scotia (hereafter referred to as PANS), Minutes 
of the Halifax Firewards, 1804-35, 21 September 1821; ARMSTRONG, "The First Great in 
Toronto, 1849", p. 217; Halifax British Colonist, 10 September 1859; STEWART, Great Fire 
of Saint John, p. 138. 
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their function, they required substantial complements. The hose companies 
- the smallest - had to prepare the links from a water supply to the 
pumps and carefully maintain the leather hose (the cotton and rubber 
replacements were introduced only after mid-century). Hook and ladder or 
axe companies tore up roofs or pulled down buildings. Engine companies 
required the largest membership since the basic pumps of the era took 
the combined efforts of a dozen to thirty men. 40 All the standard designs 
were light and small, necessary requirements for manual manoeuvring 
though the often obstructed streets and lanes. After tugging the engine 
to the fire , the company began the exhausting work of maintaining a 
constant 75 to 150 foot stream. Sustaining the output demanded more 
than one hefty team per engine. When a Halifax company dropped below 
eighty members the Chronicle remarked that this could barely man one 
engine efficiently. Fredericton settled upon thirty for each of its four 
companies; Toronto and Saint John appeared satisfied with forty per 
company, resting on the possibility of drawing in spectators. 41 
The steam engine, widely adopted during the 1860s, not only dis-
charged a greater volume of water for a greater distance, but it dismissed 
the chronic complaint of old- lack of manpower. Four or five men could 
manage the work of a ten-fold number. Civic authorities appreciated 
the implications. The steam pumps also made them aware of technical 
expertise. On the trips to purchase popular American fire fighting equip-
ment manufactured in Manchester, New Hampshire or Seneca Falls, 
New York, civic officials typically checked into American fire depart-
ments. The exception, St. John's, waited three decades longer than other 
centres until a post-mortem on its 1892 disaster. Ultimately, the drastic 
reduction in manpower facilitated municipal takeover of fire-fighting 
forces . Professional departments under city authority became the order of 
the day. However, the cost and mass of the engines provided a few 
liabilities. Steam pumps were expensive, English models costing from 
£ 500 to £ 1,500 while American engines ranged from the $3,000 paid by 
Halifax in 1861 to a $6,000 model purchased by Toronto in the same 
year. Engines weighed from 3,000 to 7,000 pounds. 42 Clearly, hardy 
4° For an account of fire prevention equipment in Canadian cities by 1890 see 
Report of John McCowen re Fire Department, Appendix, Journal of the Legislative As-
sembly of Newfoundland, 1893, pp. 265-69. Early fire-fighting techniques are covered in the 
following: PANS, Shannon Family Papers, Rules and Articles of the Hand-in-Hand Fire 
Company ... 1789. Revised by a Special Meeting ... 1835 (Halifax : John Munro, 1835); 
PAC, Pamphlet Collection, Rules and Orders, To be Observed by the Friendly Fire Club 
(n.p. , 1826), p. 3 ; PANS, Vertical Manuscript File, Union Engine Company Papers; PAC, 
Pamphlet Collection, The Quebec Fire Society ; Charlottetown Examiner quoted in The 
Islander, 20 July 1866. 
41 City of Toronto Archives, History of the Toronto Fire Department (Toronto: The 
Burial Fund of the Toronto Fire Fighters , n.d.), p. 16; New Brunswick Courier, 25 April 1840 ; 
New Brunswick Reporter, 15 April 1851; Montreal Pilot , 21 July 1852; City of Toronto 
Archives, History of Toronto Fire Department, p. 26. 
42 See instructions given to Halifax delegation to travel to the United States, buy a 
steam engine and inquire into ways of improving organization: Halifax Evening Express, 
13 May 1861. For a later mission see E. H. KEATING, A Report on the Means of Preventing 
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volunteers could not haul these. Horses could, but municipal corporations 
hesitated to spend more money on the increasingly expensive overhead 
of their newly acquired obligations for fire protection. So at first they 
practised a dangerous economy. In Toronto, privately owned horses were 
pressed into service; Saint John purchased horses but shared them with 
other departments. On the day of that city's great fire in 1877, roadcrews 
had the teams. Even into the early twentieth century, Halifax hitched 
fire department horses onto the sprinkling carts which laid down street 
dust. As well, the steam pumps required roughly ten minutes to build 
pressure and, ironically, they needed a steady supply of fuel. 43 By the 
1870s, steam pumps and telegraphic alarm systems pointed toward a new 
efficiency, but traditions, fiscal stringency, and equipment deterioration 
produced weak links. 
One point of contact for tradition and progress involved virile vol-
untarism. The steam engine tended to relegate the celebration of brawn 
and the social club atmosphere of fire companies into the background 
of fire-hall life. To be sure, elements of these conditions lingered long 
after they had been challenged by demands for professional training. All 
the same, the old ways had been affected - a point supported by recall-
ing the nature of volunteer companies. They evolved from the European 
and American colonial practice of forming associations for mutual protec-
tion of property. Not all of this pertained to extinguishing flames. Members 
of the Hand-in-Hand Company of Halifax were "to prevent those evils -
which are too frequently felt by the unfortunate from the baseness and 
treachery of wicked and designing persons". The practice of protecting 
movable property from flames and theft endured, at least to the end of 
the nineteenth century, with fire underwriters maintaining salvage wag-
ons. 44 Since fires did not distinguish between property of members and 
that of the general public, companies necessarily provided extended 
protection. Nonetheless, the question of narrow loyalty was a persistent 
obstacle to a city-wide fire-fighting capacity. 
Expenses of the companies were met to a minor extent by dues. 
Municipal assistance, chimney taxes, donations from merchants, and 
grants of equipment from insurance companies met the bulk of company 
requirements. As well, members claimed exemption from certain citizen 
obligations: serving in the militia, on juries, or doing statute labour. 
These minor privileges were not pressed in time of need. The Union 
Company resolved in 1839 that owing to "the warlike complexion of the 
the Loss of Life and Property by Fire (Halifax: Morning Herald, 1883). On purchase prices 
and descriptions see The Islander, 27 July 1866; Halifax Express, 8 February 1861; Ottawa 
Times, 12 September 1870; City of Toronto Archives, History of the Toronto Fire Depart-
ment, p. 24. 
43 New Brunswick Museum, "An Investigation into the Causes of the Great Fire", 
(unpublished MS., 1877), testimony of Thomas Master, Fire Chief, and Samuel Piercy, 
Engineer of No.2; New Dominion, 4 August 1877; Thomas H. RADDALL, Halifax, Warden 
of the North (New York: Doubleday, 1969), p. 235. 
44 Rules and Articles of the Hand-in-Hand Fire Company, p. 3; Report of John R. 
McCowen re Fire Department, pp. 265-69. 
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late news from the State of Maine" members would not claim a militia 
exemption. 45 In lieu of tangible gain, much of the company's reward 
derived from social pleasure, a sense of belonging to a fraternal body. 
There were bound to be exceptions, but for the most part volunteer com-
panies took form as closed and homogeneous associations. A few of 
the early ones evolved exclusively from concerns of a civic elite. The 
Sun Fire Company of Halifax consisted of "first families" ; the Hand-in-
Hand Company had a similar social lustre. When this company held its 
annual picnic at McNab's Island in 1851 it drew the attendance of the 
Speaker" of the Assembly, Vice-Admiral Sir George Seymour, and the 
band of the 42nd Regiment. The Union Engine Company of the same 
city barred Catholics. Montreal companies divided along ethnic and 
social lines with only seven or eight of the twenty-one Captains and 
Lieutenants in 1852 being French Canadian. 46 "Outsiders" and artisans 
formed their own companies in several centres. Most cities had axe com-
panies which essentially enlisted carpenters and joiners, their being 
"accustomed to and in the habit of demolishing buildings". Other non-
elite companies were not always so welcome. A Toronto company of 
the wrong social stripe suffered, being "unable to find a love-spot in 
the chief engineer's heart and whilst other companies had only to ask 
and their wants were supplied No. 2 never got even a hearing". Hamil-
ton's No. 1 Company consisted wholly of Orangemen, while No. 2 allowed 
only teetotallers. 47 Amid communities fragmented by ethnic, sectarian and 
social allegiances, fire companies flourished as one outlet for social 
activity, expression of rivalries, and announcement of individual commit-
ments. 
Depending on the company and the observer, fire halls could either 
be pleasant reading-rooms with draughts, backgammon, and whist or 
schools for vice, but much of the social display and competition that 
characterized rival companies arose from harmless pride, reflected in 
the emphasis on allegiance and display. St. John's Cathedral Brigade 
elected a purple and red uniform with a mitre-shaped shield on the hel-
met. The Hamilton Hose Company settled on a red double-breasted 
shirt as one of its first orders of business. Dandy uniforms lent colour 
to holiday parades, excursions and civic celebrations. Uniforms, armbands 
45 City of Toronto Archives, History of the Toronto Fire Department, pp. 16, 20; 
Kingston Public Library, Special Collections, Edwin Ernest HoRSEY, "Early Fire Regulations 
and Volunteer Firemen'_'., "Cataraqui, Fort Frontenac, Kingstown, Kingston" (unpublished 
MS.), pp. 170-71; Stati'tes of Canada, 4 and 5 Vic. Cap. 43 ; 14 and 15 Vic. Cap. 85; PANS, 
RGl, Volume 518, Halifax Fire and Fire Protection, 1858-78, George M. Young to the 
Chairman Investi&ating the Union Company Request for the Privilege of Exemption from 
Militia Service, 28 February 1839. 
46 PANS, Vertical Manuscript File, Fire Protection in Halifax, A. F. Macdonald, 
Provincial Archivist, to Mr F . Williams, n.d.; PANS, Occasional Scrapbook, Hand-in-
Hand Company, 1801-70, article on a picnic 14 July 1851; Halifax Morning Journal, 26 
September 1859; Halifax Evening Express, 10 April 1861 ; Montreal Pilot, 28 July 1852. 
47 PAC, Pamphlet Collection, The Quebec Fire Society, pp. 12-13; City of Toronto 
Archives, History of the Toronto Fire Department, p. 20; City of Toronto Archives, 
Toronto Fire Department Investigation, 1915 (typescript); Richard BUTLER, "The Early 
History of the Hamilton Fire Department, 1816-1905", Wentworth Bygones, No.8 (1969). 
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and banners - whether sported by militia, craft associations, or fire 
companies - seemed all the rage in an outdoor society which revelled 
in parades, picnics, and contests. Competitions matching strength, speed, 
and equipment provided further occasions to affirm group spirit, extending 
even to civic rivalries. In May 1851, the No. 5 Engine Company of Saint 
John travelled by steamer to Fredericton where it participated in contests 
at Phoenix Square. The hosts arranged lunch at Brown's Hotel and the 
guests lit fireworks - something already considered the prerogative of 
fire companies. International excursions brought New York fire companies 
to Montreat where brigade bands and the inevitable firemen's ball enliven-
ed popular entertainment. 
Entertainment aside, features of pride and competition, a loyalty 
to an association other than the community-at-large, had lamentable 
consequences. Toronto companies delighted in pulling their engines at 
break-neck speed along sidewalks after a fire. In 1858, Terence Meehan 
of No. 3 Company stumbled to his death. Among some Montreal com-
panies intense rivalry, torchlight processions, political connections and a 
general delight in doing things with excitement prompted the anglophone 
Pilot to regret that the English system of protection had not been trans-
planted. In the old country, insurance offices had a role in selecting 
men and governing their conduct. With money as a focus rather than 
sectarian bravado, fights and hose slashing incidents, it was claimed, 
might have been eliminated and the quality of fire protection improved. 
Another difficulty with the voluntary spirit was reflected in allegations 
that companies played favourites or protected members' property. John 
Essen, MPP and former Chairman of the Halifax Fire Committee had 
no complaint with service. Indeed, he presented firemen with £ 25 for 
rescuing his property. It was alleged that he was the sole individual within 
three blocks to be so blessed. Favour or disfavour could extend to a whole 
district. Montreal's Protestant Union Fire Company refused in the summer 
of 1857 to attend fires in the Irish-Catholic section of St. Anne's Ward, 
claiming that local rowdies had assaulted the volunteers. 48 
To be fair to the fire companies, it was often beyond the control 
of well-trained and equipped groups to combat a conflagration. Few 
expected the firemen to accomplish anything with major fires. The best 
advice for fire-fighting was to "take care of the small fires, and we will 
not be troubled with big ones". Dousing fires was a lilliputian measure. 
When it failed, hook and ladder or axe companies rushed to create fire-
breaks. If manual efforts did not topple structures fast enough, the local 
garrison supplied artillerymen or engineers to set explosives. From the 
48 Edward B. FoRAN, "St. John's City: Historic Capital of Newfoundland", in 
The Book of Newfoundland, ed. : J. R. Smallwood (St. John's: Newfoundland Book 
Publishers, 1937), p. 20; Hamilton City Hall, City Records, Minutebook of the Hamilton 
Hose Company, p. 1; New Brunswick Reporter, 25 July 1851; HoRSEY, "Cataraqui", pp. Hi6-
81; New Era, 27 May 1857; City of Toronto Archives, History of the Toronto Fire De· 
partment, p. 21; Montreal Pilot, 21 July 1852; Halifax Morning Journal, 7 October 1859; 
New Era, 30 July 1857. 
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time of the earliest alarms the military usually had been involved, forming 
bucket bridages, backing up the volunteer engine crews, or occasionally 
supplying their own pumps. The firewards of Halifax made a formal 
agreement with the garrison commander in 1817 whereby one hundred 
buckets were stored near the guard rooms. In 1845 at Quebec, troops 
under Major General Sir James Hope removed "piles of deals which it 
was supposed might aid in continuing the fire [while] hundreds of civilians 
stood passive around". Although the bugle had sounded the alarm at night 
when troops "were scattered in various directions", the quick response 
and useful service of the Quebec garrison earned considerable respect. 
Significantly, it coincided with a pivotal year in English-French reconcilia-
tion. In this context, the three heroic episodes of the military during the 
first fire of 1845 may well have been significant in soothing communal 
friction. The soldiers cleared away a timber yard, turned the fire away 
from a powder magazine and blew up two houses thereby deflecting the 
fire so that it burned itself out. 49 
Blasting - predominantly a military operation - often fell short of 
a science. During the second 1845 fire, explosions had tragic results as 
the shock collapsed a neighbouring house, killing two men. A series of 
frank military reports recounted incidents of success and failure, but 
they confirmed heroism as powder kegs wrapped in wet blankets were 
rushed into buildings in the immediate path of the blaze. Destruction 
of private property left hard feelings as well as complicating disputes 
over compensation. To limit a fire on New Year's Day 1854, two Halifax 
aldermen and one fireward ordered the pulling down of a house. The 
Halifax Fire Insurance Company refused to pay a £ 400 claim because 
the house was pulled down before it was burnt; the city denied legal 
responsibility since only three firewards actually could order preventive 
action. The owner sued the military for heeding an illegal order. Relations 
between the city and garrison cooled to the extent that on 9 September 
1859 the stalemate continued while a blaze destroyed Granville Street. 50 
At mid-century, then, fire fighting remained an ad hoc affair of 
heroics and fiascos. The interplay of private companies, spectators, civic 
authorities and military made for confusion. In most centres responsibility 
for co-ordination officially resided with the fire wards until mid-century. 
These appointees, four to twelve in a city, were charged with overseeing 
the storage of dangerous materials, checking obvious fire hazards, in-
vestigating causes of fire and co-ordinating volunteer companies. Wielding 
49 St. John's Evening Telegram , 4 November 1892; PANS, Minutes of the Halifax 
Firewards, 15 January 1817 ; Quebec Mercury , 3 May 1845 ; C.O. 42, Volume 526, Major 
General J. A. Hope to General Sir R. D. Jackson, 30 May 1845; MoNET, The Last Cannon 
Shot, passim; Quebec Mercury, 31 May, 19 June 1845. 
so Quebec Mercury, 1 July 1845; La Minerve , 8 July 1845. Similar misfortunes hap-
pened in St. John's : St. John 's Times, 17 June 1846. The military reports appear in PAC, 
RG8, C Series, Volume 316, pp. 359-63, 364-65, 384-87, 395-96, PANS, RG5, Series G.P. , 
Volume 6, Miscellaneous B, 1857, Petition from S. Seldon to Lieutenant Governor Sir 
Gaspard Le Merchant, 1 January 1857. For reports that the garrison was not called out see 
Halifax British Colonist, 10 September 1859 ; Halifax Morning Journal, 23 September 1859. 
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their distinctive rods of office, firewards had authority to direct the com-
panies, press civilians into fire-fighting and order the pulling down of 
buildings. Most had no specialized knowledge; scattered in separate wards 
they could not provide prompt and co-ordinated leadership during major 
fires. A division of authority among the separated firewards during the 
1852 Montreal conflagration prevented firemen from pulling down buildings 
along St. Denis Street which might have checked the fire. Hence post-
disaster inquiries and editorials recommended concentrating authority in 
one individual. By the time of widespread introduction of steam engines, 
a focus in authority was being achieved through placing the duties of 
firewards in the hands of a chief engineer. st 
The hiring of full-time firemen evolved contemporaneous with the 
efforts to concentrate authority. Cincinnati received credit for establishing 
the first fire department · in 1853. The innovation spread quite rapidly. 
Even before the professional model had been set in the United States, 
Quebec had searched for a means of asserting municipal control and 
setting standards. In 1844, City Council formed a Fire Committee with 
some supervisory capacity, watching the conduct of volunteer companies. 
After the 1845 disasters, there was talk of a hired force. By 1858, fire-
fighting had been added to the duties of the police force, reflecting the 
prevailing attitude that no special training was necessary for either service. 
Finally, in 1866, the police were relieved of this function and Quebec 
imposed complete civic control, hiring its Fire Department. Montreal 
already had abandoned the volunteer system in 1863 ; Toronto waited 
until 1874. At Halifax, however, a voluntary system hung on stubbornly. 
Erroneously, the Mayor in 1885 reported that "Halifax is old fashioned 
enough to prefer her extremely effective Fire Department composed of 
volunteers, to a paid department as now exists in most other cities." 52 
In truth, Halifax only retained its volunteer arrangement after a most 
revealing struggle forced moderate reform. 
The Halifax blaze of 1859 and an extraordinary rise in insurance 
premiums precipitated appeals for new arrangements. There was the 
hypocrisy of the Union Engine Company, decrying a lack of manpower 
while it functioned as an exclusive society. When an infuriated citizen 
called for a "hired" department selected "irrespective of creed or coun-
try" and representing all classes, Mayor Samuel R. Caldwell reacted 
by presenting the Company with a banner and a congratulatory note. 
Caldwell once had been Captain of the Company. As elsewhere in North 
s 1 PANS, " An Act for Appointing Fire wards" , Statutes at Large (Halifax : Howe 
and Sons, 1805); New Brunswick Courier, 25 April 1840 ; PAC, Pamphlet Collection, Quebec 
Fire Society; Montreal Pilot, 13 July 1852. 
52 Charles GLAAB and Theodore BROWN, A History of Urban America (New York: 
Macmillan, 1976), p. 80 ; Antonio DROLET, La ville de Quebec : Histoire municipa/e de /'in-
corporation ii Ia Confederation (Quebec : La Societe historique de Quebec, 1967), III: 24-27 ; 
John I. CooPER, Montreal: A Brief History (Montreal : MeGill-Queen's University Press, 
1969), p. 97; City of Toronto Archives, History of the Toronto Fire Department, p. 26; 
Phyllis R. BLAKELEY, Glimpses of Halifax (Belleville: Mika, 1973), pp. 119-20. 
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America, the fraternity of volunteers extended into civic politics. 53 The 
controversy revived when City Council purchased an American steam 
engine and prepared to tum it over to the Union Engine Company. During 
a tumultuous meeting, the exclusion of Catholics and the political activities 
of the Company were exposed. By a narrow margin Council demanded 
that more men be recruited and that this be done by public advertisement. 
The Company quickly raised the men but still prohibited "outsiders". 
In retaliation the Council determined , by a narrow margin, to enforce an 
old by-law specifying that the Company's elected officers had to be ap-
proved by Council. Regretting "the arbitrary and hasty course", the 
Company prepared an obituary notice and tendered resignations: "Cor-
poration de clair War: Company asserts its independence and resigns as 
one man hurrah for old Union." Support proved considerable, for there 
existed an adherence to the voluntary spirit - best expressed by the 
"orator of the evening" at an 1860 Firemen's Benefit in Southern's 
Lyceum. 
All honour to the Firemen - that fearless noble band -
Defenders of our homesteads , like heros do they stand, 
A phalanx firm of manly hearts - no mercenaries they -
But volunteers they take the field, and mercy points the way. 54 
Thus, instead of a hired force, a new volunteer company was incorporat-
ed . But old Union paid the price - by 1870 it was "manned chiefly by 
elderly veterans of the fire brigade and devoted to salvage work". 55 
III 
Refugees, spectators, soldiers, and firemen milled on the streets 
during the chaos of a major fire , while another group - bands of looters 
- discovered ample opportunity for lifting goods. Endeavouring to save 
stock, merchants found eager volunteers all too willing to help with rescue 
operations. Mter the 1846 conflagration, HMS Vindictive searched outward 
shipping from St. John's to prevent ''the removal of considerable property 
which had been feloniously obtained". Mter the 1892 fire, St. John's 
detectives discovered Brussels carpets saved from disaster being used in 
Freshwater Bay. Saint John police traced stolen goods to Nova Scotia 
in 1877; from the same fire came tales of residents remaining in their 
homes, fearful of looters. At times, looters were alleged to have worked 
to keep fires burning. Incendiarism provided diversion and, during the 
1866 Quebec fire, it was claimed that looters armed with axes cut hoses 
to assist the conflagration. Even the confusion at lesser street fires present-
53 Halifax Evening Express , 10 April 1861; Halifax Morning Journal, 26 September 
1859; PANS, RG1, Volume 518, Samuel Caldwell to the Union Engine Company, 8 June 
1860. 
54 PANS, RG1, Volume 506, Union Engine Company Minutebook, 7 May 1861. 
The doggerel came from an unidentified clipping in RG1, Volume 518. 
55 RADDALL, Halifax : Warden of the North, p. 21. 
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ed opportunities. "Comme cela arrive toujours dans ces occasions-la, 
les voleurs n' ont pas manque de profiter de cet incendie." 56 
It is impossible to estimate the volume of looting, although insurance 
claims afford some insight into the problem. In one notable instance, an 
insurance company refused to compensate for loss by theft asserting that 
fire insurance only covered items consumed by fire; it did not include 
goods stolen from the street. The Chief Justice instructed the jury to favour 
the claimant, arguing on the basis of an earlier case that, if insurance did 
not compensate for looted goods, then merchants would simply lock their 
doors and let the stock bum. Significantly, in another fire-theft case, 
Lazare versus the Royal Insurance Company, Mr Justice Roberts disclosed 
the extent of such crimes when he noted that he had experience with 
many similar situations. 57 
Theft continued amidst the ruins. After the first Quebec fire of 1845, 
residents who returned to their homes discovered "reckless plunderers 
who sought, in the stupor which this sudden visitation occasioned, to 
carry on their shameless trade and to plunder the terror-striken inhabitants 
of the little the fire had spared them". Thieves made the rounds in St. 
John's in 1892 with horse and cart long after the fire to remove building 
materials from construction sites. Maintenance of civil order became a 
major civic concern during the nights after a conflagration. Loss of employ-
ment, the forced contact of multiple family households, and sheer dis-
tress reinforced an urge for tavern conviviality. Reports of mounting 
dissipation combined with those of looting to register frenzied alarm. 
Editorials condoned lynching. If cities had yet to organize police forces, 
the night watches were increased, not without controversial effects. 
A Charlottetown night watch of "youngmen apprentices and others, who 
have no stake in the community, get placed on the watch ; and so far 
as doing any good, they get drunk, and hoot and yell about the streets 
to the disgust of responsible people." Communities which had organized 
a police force, hired extra constables. With increased vigilance and a 
concern about people "lurking on the public streets and not giving a 
satisfactory account of themselves", arrests increased. In Saint John the 
police chief reported in 1878 that crimes had risen since the fire because 
.. . as a rule, it is not the best or most orderly class of men in any branch of 
business, who require to come to work, for a time, to a city in the position 
which Saint John was last summer, when employers were glad to get any 
kind of men ; and it will be seen that the increase [in crime] is chiefly amongst 
the strangers. ' 8 
56 St. John's Times, 8 July 1846; St. John 's Evening Telegram , 19 September 
1892; Halifax British Colonist, 13 September 1859; STEWART, The Story of the Great Fire , 
p. 93; New Dominion, 14 July 1877; Ottawa Citizen, 4 October 1866; Courrier du Canada , 
22 July 1867. 
" Quebec Morning Chronicle, 30 November 1866 ; Library of Parliament, Pamphlet 
Collection, Important Fire Insurance Case , Adolphe Lazare versus the Royal Insurance 
Company before Mr. Justice Richards , May /858 (Toronto : Maclean Thomas, 1858), p. 21. 
'
8 Quebec Mercury, 3 June 1845; St . John's Times , 17 March 1847 ; New Brunswick 
Reporter, 15 November 1850; St. John' s Evening Telegram, 26 September 1892. Concern 
about order after dark in a devastated city is apparent in Provincial Archives of New Bruns-
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To aid the local government in matters of relief and in removing dangerous 
ruins, but also in keeping order, the military set up camps near the ruins. 
The burdens of organizing immediate relief were awesome. The 
vulnerable districts where fire had its greatest play, by their very rough 
form, sheltered individuals whose condition could slip from self-sufficiency 
into distress with the loss of clothing and household effects. According 
to an 1845 investigator, St. John's fires usually started "in grog shops 
and the houses of the working classes". The 1845 fire at Quebec destroyed 
the artisan district of St. Roch. A record of relief requests in Saint John 
(1877) listed claims which indirectly describe the social make-up of the 
burned-over area (Table 2). 
Table 2. -OCCUPATIONS AND NATIONAL ORIGINS, 
OF RELIEF APPLICANT, SAINT JOHN FIRE, 
3 JULy 1877 TO 30 JUNE IS78. 
Occupation Number Percent National Origin Number Percent 
Widows 625 20.6 Canada 1,427 47.1 
Labourers 464 15.3 Ireland 1,037 34.3 
Mariners 190 6.3 England 274 9.1 
Seamstresses 144 4.7 Scotland 129 4.3 
Joiners 120 4.0 United States 77 2.5 
Cartmen & Coachmen 115 3.8 Others 83 2.7 
Boarding-house Keepers 110 3.6 
Shoemakers 80 2.6 
Riggers 60 2.0 
Others (less than 
50 per occupation) 1,059 37.1 
Totals 3,027 100.0 3,027 100.0 
Prestigious relief committees, invariably autonomous from city 
councils, first co-ordinated local food and shelter resources while issuing 
appeals to other cities. Most conflagrations swept through cities during 
"the mild season"which at least permitted leeway for planning to con-
front the combined crises of devastation and winter. Food, for example, 
did not present a pressing concern until winter, since local supplies, 
rural donations, and relief committee purchases from other communities 
covered the summer and fall. Precautionary measures were taken against 
price gouging and shortages. The Quebec Relief Committee of 1845 sold 
a portion of the food supplies that it controlled at half price while a year 
later the Governor of Newfoundland placed an embargo on the export 
of provisions from the colony since its agricultural hinterland was so 
limited. 59 In time, relief vessels and, in later years, trains arrived with 
wick, Saint John Common Council Minutes, 25 and 26 June 1877; New Dominion , 10 Novem-
ber 1877; Charlottetown Herald, 15 August 1866 ; The Islander, 24 August 1866. " Report of 
the Chief Police", in Reports of the Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John ... 
1877 (Saint John: Barnes and Company, 1878), p. 20. 
59 PAC, MG24, Dll, Visits to Canada and Newfoundland, pp. 61-62. Quebec 
Mercury, 3 July, 23 October 1845; New Brunswick Reporter, 29 November 1850; Courrier 
du Canada, 24 October 1866; St. John's Times, 17 July 1846; Saint John Daily Citizen, 
30 June 1877; Quebec Mercury , 24 June 1845. 
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the barrels of pork and flour. Everyone looked apprehensively toward 
"winter's rude blasts", knowing that "the suffering during the coming 
winter must be greater". Most of the homeless doubled up with families 
in surviving dwellings. Warehouses, customs buildings, drill halls, hos-
pitals, immigrant sheds, and even stables provided emergency shelter. 
The steamer New York sheltered and fed 1,000 the first night after the 
1877 destruction in Saint John. A number of victims were encouraged 
to decamp. A flight to the countryside followed the 1845 Quebec fires; 
many of St. John's homeless of 1846 dispersed to the outports. The Quebec 
Relief Committee of 1866 purchased tickets from the Grand Trunk and 
Richelieu Railway. 6o 
For those remaining who could afford neither to build nor rent, 
relief committees threw up temporary sheds. The 1846 shelters in St. 
John's were described as "hen houses", as much a reference to simple 
design as to overcrowding, for the least costly method of shelter construc-
tion merely allowed a sloping roof. Those erected at St. John's in 1892 
were one hundred feet long, twenty feet wide and ten feet high sloping 
to seven feet in the rear. Each of these sheds housed a half-dozen fam-
ilies. Montreal's temporary tenements constructed for the winter of 
1852-53, were 240 feet by 30 feet and two stories high with unplaned 
floors and walls. One, far from the city at Pointe St. Charles, housed 
the unemployed. Four policemen were retained. Closer in, the employed 
Protestants and Catholics were lodged in separate compounds. Over-
crowding and friction were unavoidable. Drinking and fighting in Quebec's 
structures prompted expulsion of over ten percent of the residents by 
late October 1845. 61 Tent quarters routinely provided by the military 
after disasters posed obvious sanitary and health problems. Heavy rains in 
the late summer of 1846 drenched the homeless in the tents at St. John's 
causing respiratory ailments and "relieving the more delicate amongst 
them from this world's suffering and sorrow". Temporary public shelters 
housed only a small proportion of those who had lost homes. Instead, 
relief committees made cash distributions available so that recipients 
might find or build their own winter lodgings. Donations of deals and 
planks facilitated some private reconstruction. When it came to the cash 
disboursements, relief committees adhered to the general procedures for 
outdoor relief. A committee of visitors inquired into the background 
and needs of applicants. 62 
6° For emergency shelter see Quebec Mercury, May-July 1845; St. John's Times, 
17 June 1846 ; Montreal Pilot, 14 July 1852; Courrier du Canada, 17 October 1866; Saint 
John Morning Freeman, 1 September 1877; St. John's Evening Telegram, 1 September 
1892; Saint John Daily Citizen, 22 June 1877. On transiency of victims see Quebec Mercury, 
3 June 1845; Courrier du Canada , 19 November 1866. 
61 St. John's Times, 27 March 1847; Montreal Pilot, 22 October 1852; St. John 's 
Evening Telegram, 1, 12, 19 September 1892; Montreal Pilot, 22 October 1852; Quebec 
Mercury , 23 October 1845. 
62 For donations of planks see St. John's Times, 19 September 1846, 8 July 1846; 
Le Pays, 25 October 1866. For relief visitors see Quebec Mercury, 8 December 1845; St . 
John 's Evening Telegram, 10 October 1892. 
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In the most routine circumstances, provision of relief inspired con-
troversy concerning the definitions of deserving and undeserving poor 
(the professional Lazzaroni), as well as the form of the welfare. Post-
fire relief provided additional complications since victims included the 
destitute as well as property owners. Once immediate relief matters had 
been attended to, the wrangling began. Were funds granted by private 
donors and governments intended to augment poor relief or were they 
to compensate property owners and speed reconstruction as well? In 
Quebec, controversy formed wheels within wheels as partisanship, nation-
ality, arid class drew in upon the debate. Following the 1845 disasters, 
the Quebec Relief Committee initially rushed ahead with distributions 
based on property loss as well as destitution. A primarily English-speaking 
group with support from the anglophone press, soon spoke in favour of 
a more circumspect policy which would aid only the destitute and permit 
saving a reserve fund for winter relief. They opposed the granting of 
funds to replace loss of property, claiming "to rescue that fund from the 
profuse hands of greedy private interest, and from the equally pernicious 
profuseness of weak and mistaken benevolence". Since destruction affect-
ed French Canadians in artisan and shipbuilding districts, they strongly 
favoured compensation for property losses, pointing out that the province 
had plunged ahead with lavish public works so why should authorities 
now seem budget conscious. Beneath the relief question moved opinions 
and aspirations of a merchant group. For them, as Lord Durham's Report 
had shown, French Canadians seemed a particularly unprogressive people, 
prone to tradition and custom. In this light, the English considered the 
control of relief funds and the rebuilding process as a means to remove 
what threatened as an unsightly and dangerous quarter of the city. If 
French Canadians could not rebuild, so much the better; progress was 
at stake. Indeed, there was talk of forcing out French-Canadian labourers 
and having "a joint stock company" convert St. Roch into "the new 
town of Quebec" graced with right-angled streets, buildings of uniform 
height, each street with a distinctive architectural style, and a full set of 
urban services. 63 The regulatory impulse and the will to survive came 
into direct conflict. For the independently-minded Canadien artisans and 
labourers, the question was a matter of survival. Ultimately, the distribu-
tions for both destitution and property losses were continued. 
Exactly the same issues redeveloped in 1866. To the editor of L' Elec-
teur those who did not favour restoration of property harboured anti-
French sentiments, since home-ownership for the French Canadian formed 
"one de ses plus grandes ambitions". The editor sensed - with good 
cause - a desire within the English community to eliminate the French 
artisan and workingman's district of St. Roch. "En efTet, c'est au St. 
Roch franc;ais que l'on en veut, c'est lui, ses progres, sa situation indus-
63 Quebec Morning Chronicle, 31 December 1866; Quebec Mercury, 3 June, 
16 August, 9 October 1845; Berean, 6, 9 April 1846. An account of the English Canadian 
perspective appears in Library of Parliament, Pamphlet Collection, HAMPDEN, Strictures 
upon a Recent Report of the Quebec Committee of Relief: With an Appendix (Quebec: 
Gilbert Stanley, 1846). 
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trielle et commerciale que l'on jalouse, et l'occasion se presente admi-
rablement bien pour le transformer a l'anglaise et y creer le systeme 
demoralisateur de tenantry." The Morning Chronicle only validated fears 
by recommending emigration as the best relief programme and editorial-
izing that begging had become "a systematic trade" encouraged by the 
presence of the many religious orders. A volatile public meeting of French 
Canadians denounced these harsh sentiments and censured the advocates 
for wishing to tum honest workers and shopkeepers into "une classe 
de pauvres proletaires, demoralises, comme il en existe dans certains 
pays", for such would be the effect of failing to restore lost property. 
A compromise plan prepared by English and French moderates set up a 
$200,000 reconstruction fund. Grants of $110 were available for those 
whose homes had been valued at less than $ 500, provided the new dwell-
ings used brick or stone. "Demonstrations bruyantes et intempestives" 
continued because of the small sums and the proviso against frame or 
shingle construction which still seemed to bar small freeholders from 
rebuilding. In fact the situation had become all the more desperate be-
cause destruction coincided with a decline in shipbuilding. 64 
Nasty confrontations over "who gets what" broke out in St. John's 
after the 1846 fire, but there religious denominations established the 
lines for the clash. When Queen Victoria appealed to Britons to assist 
St. John's she had mentioned the destruction of the Church of England 
Cathedral. This point and energetic fund raising by the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel were taken by the Governor as cause to with-
hold a portion of the relief funds for the Cathedral's reconstruction. 
The tendentious press picked at the issue for months with several papers 
pointing to the suffering of a harsh winter and hard times ahead. Mean-
while, the Governor had informed the Colonial Office that too much 
relief money had "a demoralizing effect on the people". In public meet-
ings, "bitter and vituperative personalities" damned the official party. 
A government organ, the Times, replied that as neither the Church of 
Rome nor the Church of Scotland had organized British collections, 
the Church of England should receive what those who gave had intend-
ed. As for the claim that more relief distributions were needed, the 
Times replied that many recipients behaved "like leeches full of blood 
to bursting, sucking on". 65 
64 L'Electeur, 22 December 1866; Courrier du Canada, 17 October 1866; Quebec 
Morning Chronicle, 19 December 1866. Other provocative editorials appeared on 31 De-
cember 1866, 3 January 1867. Resolutions of a public meeting called to protest articles 
published in the Morning Chronicle, Courrier du Canada, 16 January 1867. L'Electeur, 
26 January 1867. The fate of the Quebec shipbuilding industry is covered in J. I. CooPER, 
" The Quebec Ship Labourers' Benevolent Society", Canadian Historical Review, XXX 
(December 1949): 340; Albert FAUCHER, "The Decline of Shipbuilding at Quebec in the 
Nineteenth Century" , Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIII (May 
1957): 195-215. 
65 Newfoundlander, various issues through the spring and summer of 1847; Ledger 
quoted in Times, l3 November 1847; Newfoundlander, 1 July, 5 August 1847; St. John's 
Times, 7 April 1847. 
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Admittedly, relief controversies could open the breach of communal 
hostility, but generous British contributions, like garrison heroics, were a 
sign of goodwill that made the Empire more immediate and benign. Queen 
Victoria had commanded in 1845 that there should be collections for 
Quebec made in all churches throughout the Kingdom. The Church of 
England actually collected £ 25,000 which, as the Quebec Mercury 
delighted in reporting, would aid "a portion of that class of the population 
of this colony who but a few years since strove to shake off their allegiance 
to their Sovereign". Parliament had voted £20,000 and the Lords of the 
Admiralty despatched the Zealous and Arethusa with 6,000 blankets, 8,000 
jackets and 13,000 pairs of shoes. Following major conflagrations, the 
official offers of aid were supplemented by corporate and private con-
tributions. United Kingdom cities provided funds for relief and so too did 
companies having business in the colonies. The Hudson's Bay Company, 
the Canada Land Company, and Baring Brothers made contributions to 
United Kingdom subscriptions . 66 
The political dimension of fund raising became obvious after the 
Quebec fires of 1845 when it was hoped that British abundance "poured 
into laps of our suffering population of French origin" would make En-
gland "loved and honoured as it has never been in Canada". However, 
individual donations indicated the scope of non-political international con-
nections as networks of merchants, artisans, and ! ~thnic or fraternal 
societies came into play. It comes as no surprise, given the international 
community of Scots in commerce, to see aid from Greenock and Glasgow. 
Since mid-century French Canadians had been emigrating to the United 
States. In New York they organized collections for Montreal (1852) and 
Quebec (1866). Chicago's French-Canadian community, familiar to Louis 
Riel, had raised relief funds for the latter disaster. 67 Masons, Odd Fellows, 
and Knights of Pythias raised money for Saint John in 1877; at the same 
time a printers' trade union in Hamilton set up a fund "to aid their breth-
ren". Individuals did not live entirely in parochial isolation, instead many 
of them had business, national or lodge contacts. By transient wanderings, 
business trips, conventions, and correspondence, an intimate appreciation 
for aiding others balanced the admittedly aggressive commercial competi-
tion among communities. The Governor of Massachusetts, addressing a 
66 PAC, C.O. 42, Volume 40, undated and unsigned (received 29 September 1845), 
letter making reference to the Queen's request. Quebec Mercury, ll November 1845. Much 
official comment was made about British sympathy and benevolence . "Address of his Ex-
cellency the Administrator of Canada at the Opening of the Second Session of the Second 
Parliament of Canada" , Berean, 26 March 1845. Quebec Mercury, 5 August, 9 September 
1845; Quebec Mercury, 5 August 1845 . 
67 Quebec Mercury, 3 June 1845 ; On the Scots in British North America see 
DavidS. MACMILLAN , " The New Men in Action", in Canadian Business History, Selected 
Studies, 1497-1971, ed.: D. S. MACMILLAN (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), pp. 44-
103. Mention of their relief collections appears in Greenock Advertiser quoted in St. John 's 
Times, 19 August 1846 ; Le Pays, 24 November 1866. On French Canadians in Chicago see 
G. George F. STANLEY, Louis Riel (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), p. 34. For their contribution, 
see Le Pays, 3 November 1866. 
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Boston relief rally for Saint John was probably correct in remarking that 
conflagrations had one salutory influence: "They lift men up into united 
feeling, beyond the influences of petty jealousies and differences." 68 
Charity derived from heartfelt compassion, but there lurked a prudent 
side to civic collections. Comments from the Hamilton Spectator about 
raising funds for victims of a terrifying rural fire near Ottawa in 1870 came 
directly to the point. 
Surely this is a case to excite Christian sympathy and give rise to benevolent 
effort . . With all our apparent security at present, the conditions of those suf-
fering ones may some day be ours or that of those whom we would feel it a 
special duty to relieve. In the days of prosperity let us make a record which will 
enable us in such circumstances to make an unabashed appeal to others. 69 
In a manner of speaking, relief donations raised by voluntary means or 
by a special tax levy created a crude form of inter-city insurance. Obliga-
tions to neighbours and fellow sufferers were not forgotten by the great 
and the small. Pierre de Boucherville of Boucherville offered aid to 
Montreal in 1852 since the city had assisted residents of his town nine 
years earlier. On a larger scale, a fire-conscious Chicago responded 
generously to the needs of Saint John in 1877; Saint John, in turn, provided 
relief for Portland. 70 
IV 
Civic reconstruction precipitated local building booms and inflation. 
Within a few months of Quebec's 1866 fire, nearly 250 homes were under 
construction. A year after the 1877 Saint John disaster, 1,315 buildings 
were erected according to the building inspector. St. John's Municipal 
Council estimated the number of new homes built in the twelve months 
after the 1892 disaster to be 800. 71 Aside from the copious injections of 
relief money which made this possible, there were insurance settlements. 
The early history of fire insurance in British North America remains 
obscure. Certain British companies had written policies for merchants in 
the maritime centres during the late eighteenth century. The Phoenix 
claimed to have written the first such· policy, a risk in St. John's taken in 
1782. Very few firms had opened local offices before 1820, but in the urban 
68 Saint John Daily Citizen, 27, 25 June 1877; "Our Neighbours", New Dominion, 
14 July 1877. 
69 Hamilton Spectator quoted in Ottawa Times, 19 September 1870. A similar 
sentiment appears in Le Pays, 23 October 1866. 
70 Le Canadien, 19 July 1852; Kingston British Whig, 22 June 1877; "Relief to 
Portland", Kingston British Whig, 17 November 1877. 
71 Halifax Morning Journal, 23 September 1859; Courrier du Canada, 12 November 
1866; CITY OF SAINT JoHN, "Report of the Building Inspector", in Accounts of the Corpo-
ration of the City of Saint John ... 1877 (Saint John, 1878), p. 16; St. John's Evening Te-
legram, 3 March 1893. For inflation see Le Castor, 2 June 1845; National Archives, Reports 
of Saint John Consular Office (microfilm T485), Consul to Assistant Secretary of State, 9 
March 1878. 
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growth of the post-Napoleonic period there was considerable expansion. 
It is certain that the Phoenix of London had a Montreal agent in 1804. The 
first of the American companies, Aetna of Hartford, entered British North 
America in 1821, appointing Abijah Bigelow agent at Montreal. Aetna 
expanded to Halifax in 1828, Saint John in 1829, and Toronto in 1842. 
There had been "foreign insurance companies" in Toronto at least since 
1835. 72 
Domestic fire insurance companies developed slowly at first. The 
Fire Insurance Association of Halifax, formed in 1809, stands as one of 
the earliest, but urban growth and settlement in Lower and Upper 
Canada brought an era of rapid expansion for the industry. The Quebec 
Fire Assurance Company was formed in 1818, as was a Montreal Fire 
Insurance Company. York applicants requested a charter in 1829; another 
group petitioned in 1831. Finally, the British American Fire and Life As-
surance Company received a charter in 1832. In addition to these new 
joint stock companies, legislation in 1836 provided for the formation of 
mutual companies in each of the Upper Canadian Districts. The Niagara 
District (1836) and the Gore District (1839) soon had mutual associations; 
young Francis Hincks took advantage of the enabling legislation to 
promote the Horne District Mutual Fire Insurance Company in 1837. 73 
From the 1830s to the 1870s the insurance trade progressed to a point 
of maturity and immense civic influence. The centrality of fire insurance 
among the business elite had tangible character in Quebec since the Quebec 
Exchange, "where the merchants most do congregate", and the Board of 
Trade and the Telegraph Office (1851) had quarters in a building built by 
the Quebec Assurance Company in 1822. In the 1820s and 1830s, com-
panies began to exercise the kind of prudent discrimination that, over the 
decades, would lead in definite stages to complex formulas and the legend-
ary fine print. Soon after Bigelow had opened Aetna's doors in Montreal, 
that office had to pay its first claim when fire destroyed a Holt and Com-
pany building storing gunpowder. Rather than disputing, the company paid 
up. "To gain the reputation of a litigious office would be death to our 
success, and even if law and equity were clearly in our favour the mere 
fact that we disputed a loss must to some extent fix upon us that char-
acter." A vital lesson had been learned; future blanks stipulated that a 
policy was void if the insured property stored gunpowder. Over the years 
the list of prohibited articles grew. Companies also reviewed neighbour-
hood character and building materials. Bigelow avoided concentrating his 
72 PHOENIX OF LONDON GROUP, First in the Field, passim; Henry R. GALL and 
William G. JoRDAN, One Hundred Years of Fire Insurance, the Aetna Insurance Company, 
1819-1919 (Hartford: Aetna Insurance Company, 1919), pp. 59, 161; PAO, Miscellaneous 
Collection, 1829, number 10, W. J. VALE, "Notes on the Early History of Insurance 
in the Province of Upper Canada and Canada", p. 6. 
73 GALL and JORDAN , One Hundred Years of Fire Insurance, p. 162; PAC, Pam-
phlet Collection, Articles of Association Establishing a Fire Assurance Company in the 
City of Quebec (Quebec: John Neilson, 1818) ; Articles of Association of the Montreal Fire 
Insurance Company (Montreal, 1818). Both emphasized that investors were not liable for 
"debts, dues or demands of any nature"; VALE, "Notes on the Early History", pp. 1-7. 
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policies in particular areas, while the foreign companies in Toronto in 
1835 announced they would not insure wooden buildings. The Phoenix, at 
least by 1860, wanted policy hol~ers to describe the nature of "buildings 
contiguous or nearest thereto". 74 Eventually these concerns led to the 
establishment of Goad's insurance atlases. 
Sheer settlement growth in the 1840s and 1850s encouraged more and 
more insurance ventures. By 1875, ninety companies had offices in Ontario 
alone. Most were mutual firms serving a single county or region. Mean-
while, British and American companies had rushed in and, like the era's 
land speculation, bank promotions, and railway manias on the developing 
urban frontier of North America, they risked instability with under-
capitalization. Clients had no sure way of discerning the resources of in-
surance offices until a disaster - when it was too late. Similar conditions 
in the United States forced state regulatory laws. New York compelled 
companies to make a deposit in a chartered bank ; the State administered 
the fund. Throughout the 1850s, the Government of Canada received peti-
tions for parallel action. Regulatory bills were introduced, but opposition 
arose from some business communities through their boards of trade. They 
had been warned that regulation would force higher premiums or even the 
removal of British and American firms, endangering insurance coverage 
and a major source of investment capital. The demand for an annually 
published balance sheet, according to one outraged Scottish insurance 
executive, merely would provide benefits to competing companies. His 
complaint and that of the business in general have a modem refrain, for 
the insurance companies were among the earliest joint-stock enterprises 
to struggle against regulation. In the background debate, merchants and 
merchant capitalists had to weigh a classic issue, since they faced either 
the vagaries of an unregulated service or the danger of reprisals should 
there be regulation. The Sun of London had already withdrawn from 
Canada because of the risks ; the Phoenix had occasionally suspended 
operations. Others threatened to withdraw rather than accept scrutiny. 
Finally, after a decade of debate, threats, and petitioning, "An Act in 
Relation to Fire Insurance Companies not Incorporated within the Limits 
of the Province" was placed on the statute books in 1860. 75 
74 The New Guide to Quebec and its Environs (Quebec : P. Sinclair, 1851), p. 19; 
GALL and JORDAN, One Hundred Years of Fire Insurance, p. 60; VALE, "Notes on the 
Early History", p. 6; PAO, Alexander Morris Papers, 1860, Insurance Policy with the 
Phoenix Fire Assurance Company. 
" PAO, Fire Insurance Manuscripts, Box 1, By Laws, Statements, Annual Reports, 
Affidavits, Booklets, 1875-90. Many of the enclosures date from the 1840s and include lists 
of shareholders; Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada, 1850, 
pp. 73-74, ll2; P. G. M. DICKSON, The Sun Insurance Office, 1710-1960: The History of 
Two and a Half Centuries of British Insurance (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 
p. 220; A. L. Tooo, A Spark Lighted in Portland, The Record of the National Board of Fire 
Underwriters (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 9; General Index to the Journals of the 
Legislative Assembly of Canada ... 1841-1851, pp. 292-95; ... 1852-66, pp. 435-36; PAO, 
Alexander Morris Papers, John Fraser, Life Assurance Association of Scotland, to Morris, 
22 June 1865; Statutes of Canada, 23 Vic. Cap. 34; 26 Vic. Cap. 43. 
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Significantly, the next impositions of order, which led toward oligo-
poly, came from within the industry. Companies had been co-operating 
locally on premium charges by the- 1850s. A more ambitious association 
developed in an 1866 New York meeting, but this National Fire Under-
writers' Association soon lost the capacity to supervise rates and regulate 
commissions because several companies could not fully resist the short-
term allure of competitive practices. However, in 1879 the regulatory 
functions revived and shifted to regional associations - the Eastern and 
Wester~ Boards of Fire Underwriters -which extended their operations 
into Canada. By the 1880s the Canadian Fire Underwriters' Association 
prepared an extensive list of rates, forbidding rebates or discounts. Thirty-
two American, British, and Canadian companies agreed to the schedule 
which listed every trade by source of power - hand, water, and steam -
and by four classes of buildings. This left the National Fire Underwriters' 
Association with the information tasks: compiling reports on cities, pre-
paring a national building code, and later the running of the underwriters' 
laboratories. 76 By eliminating serious competition, reducing the strength of 
local agents, who once had negotiated among companies for the highest 
commissions, and by organizing the collection of information, the in-
surance industry operated as business pioneer. It became, as well, a 
significant force in local affairs. Without fire insurance pressure and a 
business community worried about insurance premiums, the pace of 
certain civic reforms - professional fire departments, buildings codes and 
waterworks- would have been considerably slower. 
Amidst the ruins, civic leaders and boosters grappled with a funda-
mental contradiction. On the one hand came hopeful predictions of a new 
city, more prosperous and beautiful - rising "like a Phoenix from its 
ashes". On the other, the "shantyvilles" that filled in around the ruins 
were too obvious and resilient to be ignored. Needless to say, it became 
difficult to dislodge them and enforce the land-use reforms and building 
codes that routinely accompanied post-fire inquiries and insurance com-
pany lobbying. The dream of civic renaissance, the phoenix syndrome, in-
variably faltered, but some basic revisions were gradually introduced. 
Changes, increasingly forced by the insurance industry, had consequences 
extending to architecture and the spatial arrangement of urban society. 
Until that critical era in so many other fire affairs, the 1860s and 1870s, the 
goals of physical reform were twofold: to reduce frame buildings and to 
widen and straighten streets so as to create a grid with firebreaks and 
76 John BAINBRIDGE, Biography of an Idea, The Story of Mutual Fire and Casualty 
Insurance (New York: Doubleday, 1952), p. 88. For early evidence of co-operative activity 
among Canadian offices see British Colonist, 3 July 1849; New Era, 28 July 1857; Halifax 
Morning Journal, 19 September 1859; Robert RIEGEL, Fire Underwriters' Associations in 
the United States (New York: The Chronicle, 1916), pp. 7-9; PAC, Pamphlet Collection, 
CANADIAN FIRE UNDERWRITERS' ASSOCIATION, Tariff of Minimum Fire Insurance Rates for 
the City of Montreal (Montreal: J. Theo. Robinson, 1888), inside cover. Members were to 
offer no rebate; the rates were extremely detailed. Also see "Appendix 3, Select Committee 
on Combinations: The Alleged Combination of Fire Insurance Companies Doing Business in 
Canada" , Journals of the House of Commons (1888), pp. 426-56. 
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easy access for fire engines. Complications and opposition related to pro-
perty rights, as well as economic pressures led to the neglect of reform 
statutes. These were worn down by exemptions and even acts of hostility. 
Plans for an 1846-47 street reform in St. John's were slashed and covered 
with ink over compensation disputes. A Quebec City loan fund created by 
the govemement to induce reconstruction in brick or stone was fully sub-
scribed, but in open defiance much of the money went for frame dwell-
ings. 77 
The Saint John arrangement for rebuilding after 1877 signalled a 
trend toward the more detailed and forceful codes which have come to 
characterize modem cities; it preceded Toronto's code by a dozen years. 
The Mayor and the City Clerk met with the Fire Underwriters of New 
Brunswick to draft a bill that would blend building codes with fire zones. 
The resulting act mapped three districts. In the first, a region located 
just back of the warehouse district which had been exempted because of 
the high costs of brick or stone storage facilities, the rules were strict. 
Wooden cornices and window frames had to be encased in non-flammable 
material. Wooden sheds were banned. Regulations were waived in the next 
area for buildings under twenty-five feet. In District Three, the exemption 
extended to buildings under thirty-six feet. Some considered the regula-
tions as laws "to grind down the poor man", but "a stem and unflinching 
assertion of the sovereign rights of the whole public" became more 
or less successful as local and imported architects designed stone and brick 
commercial blocks and office buildings. The published rates of the New 
Brunswick Board of Fire Underwriters provided an additional incentive to 
erect bland but safe buildings. Cornices, mansard roofs and outbuilding 
were penalized. Little wonder the New Dominion described the buildings 
under construction as "much simpler and chaster in design". 78 It ap-
pears that fire risk and insurance costs helped to effect more austere com~ 
mercial architecture, not just in that great centre of innovation, Chicago, 
but even in smaller cities. As a response to fires and insurance premiums, 
British North American architects made greater use of flat roofs, brick, 
cast-iron and concrete structures. 79 Artistic and technological factors did 
not revise civic architecture on their own. 
77 RIEGEL, Fire Underwriters' Association, pp. 19-21. " The Annual Report of the 
Chamber of Commerce", St . John 's Times, 19 August 1846; New Dominion, 21 July 1877; 
New Dominion, 28 July 1877; Saint John Courier, 21 September 1839; Quebec Mercury, 
14, 19 June 1845; St. John 's Times , 1 July 1846; New Brunswick Reporter, 13 December 
1850 ; Montreal Pilot, 16 July 1852 ; St . John's Times, 21 July 1847 ; Berean , 9 April 1846; 
Quebec Fire Loan Commission Report , Journal of the Legislative Assembly of Canada ... 
1847, Appendix H.H.H., letter dated 23 July 1847 ; Susan BuGGEY, "Researching Canadian 
Buildings: Some Historical Sources", Histoire sociale - Social History , X (novembre-
November 1977): 415 . 
78 New Brunswick Sessional Papers , 1877, C. 89, pp. 249-51 ; Saint John Morning 
Freeman, 8 September 1877; N ew Dominion, 5 January 1878, 18 August 1877; " Notice from 
the New Brunswick Board of Fire Underwriters on the Premiums for Fire Insurance", New 
Dominion , 11 August 1877 ; N ew Dominion , 22 September 1877. 
79 For the best study of the influence of fire on architecture see Carl CoNDIT, The 
Chicago School of Architecture : A History of Commercial and Public Building in the 
Chicago Area, 1875-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 14-25. For 
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The decades around mid-century contained one further transition 
essential to the reduction of conflagrations, namely the substitution of 
traditional water supply methods with civic owned waterworks. Aside from 
the bucket brigade or cumbersome hose lines extending to a harbour or 
reservoir, the pre-waterworks mode of supplying the manual pumps in-
volved carters. Indeed, in some cities teamsters were obliged at all times to 
carry puncheons. Communities also constructed covered reservoirs scat-
tered around in different districts, but the question of fire prevention had 
long been related to domestic water needs and sanitary concerns. At first, 
a reluctance to commit civic funds provided opportunities for private 
concerns to receive the franchises. Under-capitalized and necessarily 
cautious, these companies earned few friends and it was widely felt that 
civic ownership could accommodate superior service. Facing hostility from 
all quarters, water companies sold out at rewarding prices whenever they 
could. In some communities, negotiations over price only delayed the in-
evitable. The situation in St. John's after a serious fire in 1839 is illus-
trative. The company admitted its limitations and offered to sell. In the 
words of the president: "They sought no advantages, looked for no com-
missions, were willing to abandon all hopes of profit from the speculation 
provided they could see safety, health and comfort carried into every 
street in the City, by the conducting and placing of water-pipes and fire-
plugs; and which their own means would not admit of doing, except by 
slow degree." The City rejected the company's price. 
Civic reactions elsewhere varied, but the question of compensation 
remained central in each case. Montreal, responding to the inadequacy of 
a private system, purchased its assets in 1845 and in the mid-1850s con-
structed a new system designed by the ubiquitous Thomas C. Keefer. 
Major work on the waterworks began just after the 1852 conflagration. 
Hamilton constructed its municipal system between 1856 and 1859 with 
Keefer's guidance. After its 1845 crises, Quebec secured the right to de-
velop a municipal supply, much of it installed between 1852 and 1854. In 
Halifax, the 1859 fire inspired an examination of private facilities. Objec-
tions about the expense of a civic take-over were met with the argument 
that insurance savings alone would service the interest on the necessary 
loan. The same argument appeared in Keefer's Montreal report and in the 
Saint John press: "Our people can better afford to pay increased water-
rates than to pay exorbitant rates of premiums on policies of insurance." 
Most cities had turned to municipal ownership by the early 1860s. Negotia-
tions in Toronto, a city relatively free from major fires, dragged on until 
1874. 80 
examples of discussions about building materials and architecture see Quebec Mercury, 
12 June 1845, ll September 1846; St. John's Times, 8 August 1846, 17 April1847; Summer· 
side Progress, 5 November 1866, coverage on the reconstruction of St. John's was ex-
tensive. 
80 Saint John Courrier, 4 July 1840; Library of Parliament, Pamphlet Collection, 
Report of the Water Committee on the New Water Works at Montreal (Montreal: John 
Lovell, 1854), pp. 3-4; Thomas C. KEEFER, Report on a Preliminary Survey for the Water 
Supply of the City of Montreal (Montreal: John Lovell, 1854); Marjorie Freeman CAMPBELL, 
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Greater zeal in building programmes characterized public ownership, 
but inadequacies and careless practices jinxed water supplies in crucial 
situations. Quebec's new system proved immediately inadequate; drained 
by heavy industrial usage, it became necessary to limit the domestic flow 
to a few hours each day. The practice of cutting off the reservoir at night to 
prevent drainage caused by faulty plumbing created low pressure in many 
systems. Such a measure in 1852 contributed to the Montreal disaster. A 
similar situation in Kingston in 1877 permitted a significant commercial 
blaze. Of course, during the conflagrations the volume of water used and 
the abandonment of open hydrants by retreating fire-fighters drained 
reservoirs. After the consumption of a portion of Toronto's business 
district in 1904 the apparent necessity of a high pressure system would 




































1855-1870s purchased and expanded 
mid-1850s purchased and expanded 
1845 purchased; mid-1850s expanded 
1872-1875 purchased and expanded 
1874 purchased 
mid-1850s created 
One of the more disruptive events in the cities of British North 
America, fires provoked a few civic reform measures well before the 
pivotal years of innovation, the 1860s and 1870s. However, in the earlier 
decades of the century reform initiative would dwindle to apathy until 
disaster struck again and galvanized anew the spirit of action. To a degree 
this sequence prevailed throughout the century. Carelessness and in-
adequate provisions were not instantly banished by the numerous innova-
tions that came after mid-century. Environmental change cannot be forced 
by technological innovation alone ; the political economy of the region 
plays an essential role. Civic finances, the cost-benefit considerations of 
the business elite, and the evolution of insurance companies form expres-
sions of the political economy of British North America which had a 
direct influence on the application or non-application of technology. None-
theless, the new technical initiatives soon altered the balance in favour of 
order and safety. 
A Mountain and a City: The Story of Hamilton (Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 
p. liS; DROLET, La ville de Quebec, III : 27-31; Halifax Morning Journal, 23 September 
1859; KEEFER, Report on a Preliminary Survey for the Water Supply, p. 56; New Dominion, 
4 August 1877; Elwood JONES and Douglas McCALLA, "Toronto Waterworks: Continuity 
and Change in Nineteenth Century Toronto" (unpublished paper, Canada's Urban Past, 
Conference at the University of Guelph, 12-14 May 1977). 
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Until mid-century, reform measures had been mutable, prone to the 
abuses of indifferent enforcement. What changed, in addition to technology, 
was the force of economic restructuring. The increasing resort to fire in-
surance, accompanying a new scale in commerce and industry, gave im-
petus to enduring reforms of great importance. Artisans, specialized 
labourers and proprietors of small shops, typical of commercial cities, 
appraised the cost of building in brick or stone as greater than risk of 
losses by fire. Their limited capital, fear of large debt, and recognition of 
the potential for failure placed constraints on their building materials or 
feasible rents as well as on their sense of permanence. On the other hand, 
merchant capitalists and industrialists had to assess the matter of risk in 
consideration of large inventories, equipment and long-term insurance 
premiums. In that nebulous but real transformation from a pre-industrial 
to an industrial city, 81 with the changing scale of enterprise, there came a 
built-in shift in outlook with respect to the expense of fire protection. This 
also gave the increasingly sophisticated insurance trade considerable civic 
leverage. In a way that was not always true for urban society, private 
enterprise achieved something for which the twentieth century stands 
under obligation. As well as tangible improvements, the creation of civic 
waterworks and demands for their extension forced city governments to 
become familiar with debentures and sinking funds, the paraphernalia of 
deficit spending. Building codes, professional fire departments and 
waterworks eventually contributed to an insistence among urban reformers 
that municipal government adopt modem management. Truly the challenge 
of disaster and the response of capitalism had extensive consequences for 
the city. 82 
The texture of society was altered. It is possible to regard the decline 
of the volunteer fire companies and their activities as a minor counterpart 
to the broader demise of artisan independence. However, the parades, 
contests, pride in equipment and the tradition of organizing civic events 
would linger even among the professional fire-fighters. More in the realm of 
speculation and impressions it seems feasible that, as communities real-
ized possibilities for enhanced fire protection, the spiritual permeation of 
life diminished. References to Divine Judgement declined with the apparent 
mastery of environment. Sermons before mid-century acknowledged "the 
righteousness of God in inflicting chastisement". Later sermons involved 
the Deity, but in relation to a secular causal explanation. The 1866 Quebec 
81 City of Toronto Archives, Toronto Fire Department Investigation, 1915 (type-
script). The report notes that a city with office towers required a high pressure water system. 
On the question of a transition see Sam Bass WARNER, Jr, "If all the World Were Phila-
delphia: A Scaffolding for Urban History, 1774-1930", American Historical Review, LXXIV 
(October 1968): 26-43 . More recent studies have been cautious. A good synthesis appears in 
Howard P. CHUDACOFF, The Evolution of American Urban Society (Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1975), pp. 50-56, 64-76. 
82 On waterworks, financing and municipal institutions see John C. WEAVER, "The 
Meaning of Municipal Reform: Toronto, 1895", Ontario History, LXVI (June 1974): 89-100; 
Melvin BAKER, '"We Have No Interest, Than Your Interest, ... ': William Gilbert Gosling 
and the Establishment of Commission Government in St. John's Newfoundland, 1914" (un-
published paper, Canadian Historical Association Conference, Saskatoon, June 1979). 
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fire, beginning when a tavern brawl smashed an oil lamp, provided material 
for moral lectures. But admonishing temperance did not quite measure up 
to a call for universal "humiliation and submission". A day of fasting and 
humiliation was declared one year after the St. John's fire of 1846; in 1892 
disaster brought no similar observance. 83 Given the frequency and dimen-
sions of conflagrations, it is just possible that fire prevention accompanied 
by innovations in public health transformed popular perceptions of man's 
situation. Faith and piety continued. Yet, there is something distant in an 
1845 epic poem which accepted that 
Thy voice all-dreadful thunders in the sky, 
Terrific wrath denounced from on high, 
On guilty man- while the red lightning's blaze 
Darts, thro' the parting clouds, vindictive rays: 
Vengeance and punishment hast Thou in store, 
And canst from fiery phials, fiercely pour, 
E'en as Thou listest, on rebellious worms, 
Thy desolating wrath in fire and storms ; 
While swift destruction driven by Thy breath, 
Sweeps thro' the world, and does the work of death. 84 
83 For the decline of artisans and the question of timing see Gregory S. KEALEY, 
"Artisans Respond to Industrialism: Shoemakers, Sho~; Factories and the Knights of St. 
Crispin in Toronto", THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL AssOCIATION, Historical Papers 1973, 
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I'Uilleur, I (1976): 92-116. 
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